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13 December 2011 Security CouncilSC/10483 Department of Public Information • News and Media... : na Address: Reported to be active in Southern Somalia, lower Juba near Kismayo, mainly in...
United Nations Human Rights Report 2022 United Nations Human Rights Report 2022 Credits Prepared by The Donor and External Relations Section, in consultation with the Policy, Planning...
The Russian military command would have to pursue an identifiable operational objective if it acknowledged the operations to capture Avdiivka as an offensive effort. The "active defense” framing, therefore, allows the Russian military leadership to declare success as long as Russian forces prevent Ukrainian forces from making any significant gains, an entirely achievable objective considering that Ukrainian forces are not conducting and never have conducted counteroffensive operations in the area. The Russian command’s "defensive" framing of the offensive effort around Avdiivka as well as localized offensive operations elsewhere in eastern Ukraine suggests that it lacks confidence in the Russian military's ability to translate tactical gains into operationally significant advances.[12] Russian President Vladimir Putin, apparently concerned about decreasing Russian support for the war ahead of the 2024 Russian Presidential elections, has likely chosen to downplay the scale of Russian operations to the Russian public.[13] The increasing disconnect between heavy Russian losses in these offensive efforts and the Russian command’s framing of these operations may nevertheless fuel discontent in the wider Russian information space. ; Ukrainian intelligence reportedly damaged another train along a section of the Baikal-Amur Railway on December 1 in an apparent effort to degrade Russian logistics in the Russian Far East. Ukrainian media reported that Ukrainian intelligence sources stated that the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) conducted a special operation that damaged another train carrying fuel as it passed over a bridge along an unspecified part of the northern bypass of the Baikal-Amur Railway.[14] The SBU reportedly planned the operation to coincide with the expected rerouting of train traffic following the November 30 explosions in the Severomuysky Tunnel that disrupted a section of the East Siberian Railway in the Republic of Buryatia and damaged a fuel train, which Ukrainian media also connected to the SBU.[15] Russian sources claimed that the explosions on December 1 also occurred in the Republic of Buryatia and that six fuel tanks were completely or partially damaged.[16] Russian outlet Baza reported that travel is still blocked through the Severomuysky tunnel.[17] Ukrainian media reported that Ukrainian intelligence observed the Russian military using the railway to transfer equipment and supplies, although there are no indications that the December 1 explosions damaged the bridge along the Baikal-Amur Railway and will cause long-term disruptions.[18] The Baikal-Amur Railway and the Eastern Siberian Railway are the two major railways in the Russian Far East and connect Russia to China and North Korea, both countries on which Russia is increasingly relying for economic and military support to sustain its war effort in Ukraine.[19] ; Russian President Vladimir Putin officially changed the composition of the Russian Presidential Council for Civil Society and Human Rights (HRC) on December 1, removing several members and appointing a prominent anti-opposition media figure. Putin signed a decree on December 1 that officially removed Russian lawyers Genri Reznik and Shota Gorgadze, Novaya Gazeta journalist Leonid Nikitinsky, North Caucasus-based missing person's peacekeeping mission head Alexander Mukomolov, and Independent Expert Legal Counsel head Mara Polyakov.[20] Neither the text of the decree nor Russian media offered explanations for the removal of the aforementioned HRC members. The decree also notably nominates "public figure" Alexander Ionov to the HRC, along with several other Russian civil society figures.[21] Russian opposition media noted that Ionov has been a member of the Russian Federal Penitentiary Service since 2021 and that Ionov lodged successful appeals against Russian opposition outlets Meduza and The Bell, after which the Russian Ministry of Justice designated the outlets as "foreign agents."[22] The US Treasury has sanctioned Ionov since July 2022 for his role in supporting "the Kremlin's global negative influence operations and election interference efforts."[23] Putin last changed the composition of the HRC in November 2022, which ISW assessed was an effort to stifle domestic opposition and give prominence to figures who propagate the Kremlin's major informational lines.[24]
US_MASPSsnapshot Date: 2/29/24 NAARMO - US IGA Operators with RVSM Approval under Part 91 or Part 135 Section 3 AGHME Monitoring Flights: 01/05/2024 (excluding 1/13-1/31/22 ;8/6-8/7/20, 8...
US_MASPSsnapshot Date: 12/22/23 NAARMO - US IGA Operators with RVSM Approval under Part 91 or Part 135 Section 3 AGHME Monitoring Flights: 11/7/2023 (excluding 1/13-1/31/22 ;8/6-8/7/20, 8...
US_MASPSsnapshot Date: 3/22/23 NAARMO Documents US IGA Operators with RVSM Approval under Part 135 or Part 91 Section 3 AGHME Monitoring Flights: ACY 1/31/23 (excluding 1/13-1/31/22 ;8/6-8...
36 JAMM TRANSIT. 38 KIBOIS AREA TRANSIT SYSTEM. 40 LITTLE DIXIE TRANSIT. 42 MUSKOGEE COUNTY... 50 SOUTHERN OKLAHOMA RURAL TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM. 52 SOUTHWEST TRANSIT. 54 THE RIDE (Guymon...
US_MASPSsnapshot Date: 9/29/23 NAARMO - US IGA Operators with RVSM Approval under Part 91 or Part 135 Section 3 AGHME Monitoring Flights: 09/7/2023 (excluding 1/13-1/31/22 ;8/6-8/7/20, 8/11...